Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of business groups on dividend policy of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, taking into account the ownership structure of companies and the pyramid structure of business groups formed in Iran. Method: The statistical population of the present study is Tehran Stock Exchange. Based on the screening, the sample of this research includes 1679 observations from 441 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 1397-1393. The required data has been extracted from the site of the Tehran Securities Exchange and Securities and Exchange Organization. Results: Consistent with the forecasts the results of this study show that the amount of dividends in companies affiliated to business groups is higher compared to independent companies. Also according to the results obtained in this study, among the companies affiliated to business groups, increase of voting rights of the final shareholder in group, the dividend paid by them increases. Also, in each of the business groups, companies located in the lower layers of the pyramid in the groups pay more dividends. In addition, the dividends paid by companies increase as the concentration of ownership in the hands of the largest shareholder or major shareholders increases. Conclusion: From the results of this study, it is concluded that the formation of business groups and the pyramid structure of ownership formed between them can affect the dividend paid by the group member firms. Contribution: These results can help investors who attach great importance to corporate dividends to choose a company to invest in. It can also help shareholders of companies to take advantage of the internal capital market formed among groups and to use the dividends of other companies with more liquidity to address the lack of liquidity of member companies.

This paper addresses whether and how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) affects shareholder wealth (firm value) by focusing on the trade-off between improved corporate governance leading to a lower cost of capital and increased managerial compliance costs of regulations. We use an analytical model of solving the management utility maximization function and the change in stock prices in response to SOX regulations. We tested our analytical model by empirically investigating financial restatements in the pre and post-SOX.We conclude that all public companies can benefit from regulatory reforms, but the net effects vary across firms depending on investors’ perception about a firm’s governance quality before regulatory reforms and the required managerial compliance costs. Our analytical model also generates new predictions about management compliance behavior, which we test empirically by investigating restatements of financial statements.The model has policy implications by addressing cost-benefit of initiatives taken to improve US capital markets’ global competitiveness and they impacts on managerial compliance behavior. Our results may be relevant to regulators and public companies in Iran as the government has promoted a series of deregulation and privatization initiatives.Our model attempts to reconcile mixed empirical results of related studies pertaining to the effects of SOX on stock prices.

The stock market plays an important role in the economic development of countries. Network analysis is one of the latest methods in analyzing the stock market. It is a new concept for a macro view of the whole market in quantitative science literature. Therefore, this research analyzes the available shareholder network in the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017. This research is based on a type of data collected and analyzed is quantitative research. And, its’ type is network analysis. The research results indicate that many of shareholders are connected to each other, although a class structure governs their relations. Some of the shareholders, in comparison with others, have a better position. Having a better position caused them to encounter fewer mediators in gaining access to other shareholders, and also easier access to available resources. The shareholders’ ability in gaining access to information through the cluster of network members enhances too. Therefore, it is claimed that these shareholders can play the role of key actors in the governing structure. Also, the results of the Pareto distribution indicate that the distribution of power among the shareholders is approximately 25/75, that is, 75 per cent of the strength in the hands of 25 per cent of the shareholders.